R K Amit

In the newsvendor setting, we consider a prospect theory model with a stochastic-subjective reference point. The reference point is based on the pay-offs corresponding to the extreme values of demand; and, is influenced by the perception of costs associated with understocking and overstocking, and the pessimism level of the decision maker. Our prospect theory model describes the recent observations in the newsvendor experiments—the non-linear ordering behavior with respect to the profit margin and behavior at the extreme profit margins, in addition to the pull-to-center effect and asymmetry in ordering.

Traditional modeling in supply chain contract analysis shows that a wholesale price contract cannot coordinate a supply chain, whereas a buyback contract can coordinate. In this study, we consider a supply chain involving a risk-neutral supplier and a behavioral retailer under wholesale price and buyback contracts. We characterize the structural properties of the wholesale price contract in a supply chain with a behavioral retailer. Our study reveals that a wholesale price contract can coordinate a supply chain with a behavioral retailer under certain conditions. Under the same conditions, our analysis shows that a buyback contract coordinates the supply chain. Furthermore, we derive the conditions under which a buyback contract will not coordinate a supply chain involving a behavioral retailer. We validate our model with the existing experimental results on supply chain contracts. Finally, we show that a wholesale price contract can outperform a buyback contract in a supply chain having a behavioral retailer.