- Santanu Sarkar

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# Santanu Sarkar

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Santanu Sarkar

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Santanu Sarkar

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- PublicationCryptanalysis of variants of RSA with multiple small secret exponents(01-01-2015)
;Peng, Liqiang ;Hu, Lei ;Lu, Yao; ;Xu, JunHuang, ZhangjieShow more In this paper, we analyze the security of two variants of the RSA public key cryptosystem where multiple encryption and decryption exponents are used with a common modulus. For the most well known variant, CRT-RSA, assume that n encryption and decryption exponents (el, dpl, dql), where l = 1, …, n, are used with a common CRT-RSA modulus N. By utilizing a Minkowski sum based lattice construction and combining several modular equations which share a common variable, we prove that one can factor N when (Formula presented) for all l = 1, …, n. We further improve this bound to (Formula presented) for all l = 1, …, n. Moreover, our experiments do better than previous works by Jochemsz-May (Crypto 2007) and Herrmann-May (PKC 2010) when multiple exponents are used. For Takagi’s variant of RSA, assume that n key pairs (el, dl) for l = 1, …, n are available for a common modulus N = prq where r ≥ 2. By solving several simultaneous modular univariate linear equations, we show that when (Formula presented), for all l = 1, …, n, one can factor the common modulus N.Show more - PublicationCryptanalysis of multi-prime Î¦ -hiding assumption(01-01-2016)
;Xu, Jun ;Hu, Lei; ;Zhang, Xiaona ;Huang, ZhangjiePeng, LiqiangShow more In Crypto 2010, Kiltz, O’Neill and Smith used m -prime RSA modulus N with m ≥ 3 for constructing lossy RSA. The security of the proposal is based on the Multi-Prime Φ -Hiding Assumption. In this paper, we propose a heuristic algorithm based on the Herrmann-May lat- tice method (Asiacrypt 2008) to solve the Multi-Prime Φ -Hiding Problem when prime e > N2/3M. Further, by combining with mixed lattice tech- niques, we give an improved heuristic algorithm to solve this problem when prime e > N2/3M-1/4m2. These two results are verified by our experiments. Our bounds are better than the existing works.Show more - PublicationNew Results on Modular Inversion Hidden Number Problem and Inversive Congruential Generator(01-01-2019)
;Xu, Jun; ;Hu, Lei ;Wang, HuaxiongPan, YanbinShow more The Modular Inversion Hidden Number Problem (MIHNP), introduced by Boneh, Halevi and Howgrave-Graham in Asiacrypt 2001, is briefly described as follows: Let$${\mathrm {MSB}}_{\delta }(z)$$ refer to the$$\delta $$ most significant bits of z. Given many samples$$\left(t_{i}, {\mathrm {MSB}}_{\delta }((\alpha + t_{i})^{-1} \bmod {p})\right) $$ for random$$t:i \in \mathbb {Z}_p$$, the goal is to recover the hidden number$$\alpha \in \mathbb {Z}_p$$. MIHNP is an important class of Hidden Number Problem. In this paper, we revisit the Coppersmith technique for solving a class of modular polynomial equations, which is respectively derived from the recovering problem of the hidden number$$\alpha $$ in MIHNP. For any positive integer constant d, let integer$$n=d^{3+o(1)}$$. Given a sufficiently large modulus p,$$n+1$$ samples of MIHNP, we present a heuristic algorithm to recover the hidden number$$\alpha $$ with a probability close to 1 when$$\delta /\log _2 p>\frac{1}{d\,+\,1}+o(\frac{1}{d})$$. The overall time complexity of attack is polynomial in$$\log _2 p$$, where the complexity of the LLL algorithm grows as$$d^{\mathcal {O}(d)}$$ and the complexity of the Gröbner basis computation grows as$$(2d)^{\mathcal {O}(n^2)}$$. When$$d> 2$$, this asymptotic bound outperforms$$\delta /\log _2 p>\frac{1}{3}$$ which is the asymptotic bound proposed by Boneh, Halevi and Howgrave-Graham in Asiacrypt 2001. It is the first time that a better bound for solving MIHNP is given, which implies that the conjecture that MIHNP is hard whenever$$\delta /\log _2 p<\frac{1}{3}$$ is broken. Moreover, we also get the best result for attacking the Inversive Congruential Generator (ICG) up to now.Show more - PublicationImproving Bounds onÂ Elliptic Curve Hidden Number Problem forÂ ECDH Key Exchange(01-01-2022)
;Xu, Jun; ;Wang, HuaxiongHu, LeiShow more Elliptic Curve Hidden Number Problem (EC-HNP) was first introduced by Boneh, Halevi and Howgrave-Graham at Asiacrypt 2001. To rigorously assess the bit security of the Diffie–Hellman key exchange with elliptic curves (ECDH), the Diffie–Hellman variant of EC-HNP, regarded as an elliptic curve analogy of the Hidden Number Problem (HNP), was presented at PKC 2017. This variant can also be used for practical cryptanalysis of ECDH key exchange in the situation of side-channel attacks. In this paper, we revisit the Coppersmith method for solving the involved modular multivariate polynomials in the Diffie–Hellman variant of EC-HNP and demonstrate that, for any given positive integer d, a given sufficiently large prime p, and a fixed elliptic curve over the prime field Fp, if there is an oracle that outputs about 1d+1 of the most (least) significant bits of the x-coordinate of the ECDH key, then one can give a heuristic algorithm to compute all the bits within polynomial time in log 2p. When d> 1, the heuristic result 1d+1 significantly outperforms both the rigorous bound 56 and heuristic bound 12. Due to the heuristics involved in the Coppersmith method, we do not get the ECDH bit security on a fixed curve. However, we experimentally verify the effectiveness of the heuristics on NIST curves for small dimension lattices.Show more