Distributed knowledge and the organization of economic activity

This paper develops a simple simulation model to study the relation between the nature of knowledge and the architecture of economic systems. The market and the firm are different mechanisms for coordinating economic activity in a system where knowledge is widely dispersed. While the market solves coordination problems by decentralizing decision-making, the firm solves coordination problems by centralizing knowledge. The market incurs the cost of finding potential exchange partners and agreeing on terms of trade, while the firm incurs the cost of centralizing dispersed knowledge. The market therefore has an advantage over the firm in coordinating activities in which knowledge is difficult to centralize. The nature of knowledge involved in an economic activity influences not only the choice of the institution through which it is coordinated but also the internal structure of the institution. More specifically, the more hierarchical the firm, the better it is at using changing knowledge, but the worse it is at using knowledge which is difficult to transfer from one individual to another. Therefore, the number of layers in the hierarchy of the firm is influenced by the rate at which knowledge changes relative to the difficulty associated with communicating it.